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Borders, Constituency Politics, and
“Our Man” Voting in Electoral
Geography of Ukraine
Mykola Dobysh and Boris Yatsenko
 
Introduction
1 A common approach to electoral geography studies of Ukraine is  based either on a
compositional  effect,  which  is  often  interpreted  in  terms  of  cleavages  or  regional
factor, which continues to influence electoral behavior when compositional variables
are controlled. After the independence of Ukraine in 1991 and the first competitive
elections, scholars started to investigate national unity and nation-building as essential
for  stability  and  absence  of  conflicts  in  the  country.  Electoral  studies  of  Ukraine
resulted in statements about democratic development in divided societies and the role
of  ethnic  (nationality  according  to  Ukrainian  census  categories)  and  language
cleavages,  which  are  also  manifested  in  identity  issues  (Barrington,  1997,  2002;
Barrington & Herron, 2004; Birch & Wilson, 1999; Birch, 1995; Clem & Craumer, 2005;
Clem & Craumer, 2008; Craumer & Clem, 1999; Hesli, 1995; Hesli, Reisinger, & Miller,
1998; Hinich, Khmelko & Ordeshook, 1999; Holdar,  1995; Kubicek, 2000; Kuzio,  1996,
1998). The tradition to study prognostic value of different compositional characteristics
with  special  emphasis  on  language  and  ethnic  divisions  in  Ukraine  is  dominant  in
electoral research of the country for the last decade. It resulted in the assumption that
the structure of  society influences regional  polarization and electoral  divisions and
geography of  voting is  only  about  territorial  differences  in  population structure or
socioeconomic  characteristics.  For  instance,  it  means  that  being  Russian-speaking
Russian,  Ukrainian-speaking  Russian,  Russian-speaking  Ukrainian  or  Ukrainian-
speaking Ukrainian is a crucial factor for political beliefs and geopolitical orientations
and regions are only about differences in ethnic and language compositions. 
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2 However, language and nationality questions in Ukraine are not so vividly following
division lines.  In  the case  of  language,  while  the whole  society  could be  viewed as
bilingual because of the understanding both Russian and Ukrainian, it has more than
mentioned above categories of people based on language use and perception of the
language  question  (for  example,  existence  of  ‘surzhyk’  –  as  a  mix  of  Russian  and
Ukrainian,  perception  of  only  one  language  as  native  (some  people  even  perceive
surzhyk as  their  native  language),  using  Ukrainian  at  public  and Russian  at  home,
people  who understand but  can’t  speak well  one of  the languages,  etc.).  In  case  of
nationality,  it  is  complicated  by  a  high  share  of  mixed  marriages,  Soviet  identity,
conflicts  and  overlapping  of  ethnic  belonging  and  national  identification  with
Ukrainian civic nation. It  raises a question about the interpretative value of census
categories  of  native  language  and  nationality  in  studies  of  electoral  behavior.
Moreover, in surveys and interviews, answers to language and ethnicity questions are
dependent on how questions are asked (Osipian & Osipian, 2012). 
3 The alternative interpretation of territorial differences in political beliefs in Ukraine
suggests that regional factor is about contextual influences on political behavior, which
might be interpreted as differences in historically constituted political cultures
(Barrington, 2002; Barrington & Herron, 2004; Birch, 2000b; Katchanovski, 2006, 2014;
Kubicek,  2000).  Moreover,  region  might  be  understood  as  a  context  where  the
composition of the population might have different effects because of the pressure of
the dominating social norms. For instance, interviews conducted by Rodgers (2006) in
Eastern Ukraine reveals that some citizens in Russian speaking cities in the East of the
country feel social pressure using Ukrainian language in public. 
4 Regional differences in political beliefs in Ukraine are also understood as differences in
the  territorial  distribution  of  different  types  of  identities.  It  includes  territorial
differences in the distribution of Soviet and post-Soviet identities (Liber, 1998), modern
and premodern identities (Kuzio, 2001; Riabchuk, 2012) or different visions of national
identity  (Rodgers,  2006).  Differences  in  identities  are  also  manifested  in  different
visions of the Other and enemies. For instance, Korostelina (2013) reveals that for dual-
identity and pro-soviet identity respondents Ukrainian nationalists are the main Other.
Hrytsak (in Hann & Magocsi,  2005) states that in Lviv main enemy are communists,
while in Donetsk – Ukrainian nationalists. Kuzio (2001) accentuates that geopolitical
enemies are crucial for identity divisions in Ukraine – Russia as an enemy or Europe
and the USA as enemies. Ukraine’s location in the periphery makes it vulnerable to
foreign  policy  orientations.  For  example,  Gentile  (2015)  suggests  that  geopolitical
identity  is  dominant  over  national  and  class  identities  in  Ukraine.  However,  the
problem is that identities are often studied as compositional characteristics of regions
and not as constituted in particular places and influenced by processes at  different
geographical scales. 
5 Economic and class voting studies of electoral geography in Ukraine are also based on
approaches were geographical  units  are containers of  socioeconomic characteristics
and state statistics data for administrative units is used to reveal patterns of voting (f.
ex.  Kravchuk  &  Chudowksky,  2005;  Mykhnenko,  2009).  For  instance,  Kravchuk  and
Chudowsky (2005) reveal higher rates of state sector job losses in South and Eastern
Ukraine at  the beginning of  the 1990s,  which might have an influence on electoral
behavior,  but  it  should  be  understood  in  relation  to  other  territorial  patterns  of
electoral behavior and electoral strategies of political parties. 
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6 We  assume  that  most  of  the  studies  neglect  territorial  configurations  of  electoral
behavior  in  Ukraine.  Even  those  studies  which  suggest  regional  effect  on  electoral
behavior  are  proposing  artificial  divisions  of  the  country  in  different  numbers  of
regions: Colton (2011) uses framework of four regions, Birch (2000) suggests that five
historical regions are essential for the understanding of electoral behavior in Ukraine,
Harasymiw (2005) is generalizing results of the two regions model, Barrington (2002)
tests two, four, and eight regions models, other scholars propose their own divisions. In
our  mind,  such  approaches  neglect  the  way  different  territorial  configurations  are
manifested  in  electoral  outcomes  and  try  to  put  electoral  behavior  into  artificial
territorial shapes. Dominant in academic discourse about spatial differences in political
beliefs  in  Ukraine  ideas  about  ethnic  and  language  cleavages,  foreign  policy
orientations cleavage and identity issues are also often studied as compositional effects
using  artificially  constructed  regions  or  following  contemporary  administrative
divisions as containers and not as the factors of electoral behavior. 
7 We  assume  the  importance  of  the  territorial  organization  of  electoral  campaigns,
strategic  use  of  scale,  and  places  bounded  by  different  types  of  borders  for  the
understanding of the electoral geography of Ukraine. The paper is based on data at
polling stations level for the 2002-2014 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, which was
obtained  from  the  Central  Electoral  Office  of  Ukraine  and  geocoded.  We  use
cartographic analysis at polling stations level to clarify cases when phantom borders
appear on electoral maps of Ukraine and to reveal other territorial shapes of electoral
behavior in Ukraine. A QGIS software was used as an exploratory tool. We suggest that
knowledge of territorial shapes of voting in Ukraine is essential for further research on
the topic because they are specific manifestations of different contexts, factors, and
electoral strategies, which influence electoral behavior. 
 
Historical borders 
8 One of the underlying assumptions about the electoral geography of Ukraine is that
political  beliefs  follow  lines  of  previous  political  borders  within  which  different
political  cultures  were  constituted.  However,  most  of  the  studies  use  simplified
historical divisions without precision to the exact demarcation line of the historical
borders on contemporary electoral maps. Consequently, such important facts that the
northern part of Ternopil oblast, which is one of three Galician oblasts in Ukraine, was
not  part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  empire  and  is  not  historical  Galicia  or  that
contemporary Chernivtsi oblast was also divided between Austria-Hungary and Russian
empire  are  missed.  Moreover,  the  divide  of  electoral  preferences  between  South-
Eastern Ukraine and North-West of the country follows contemporary administrative
divisions  with  higher  accuracy  than  historical  borders  of  the  Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth in different  historical  periods.  Therefore,  aggregated at  oblast  level
data has no great explanatory value for persistent historical legacies. 
9 Peisakhin’s  (2013a,  2013b)  study of  the area along the border between Russian and
Austro-Hungarian empires reveals that the main issue, which is dividing people along
that  line  is  the  Russian question.  People  living on different  sides  of  that  historical
border  have  different  beliefs  about  Russia  as  a  political  and  economic  partner  or
political enemy and distinct perceptions of cultural distance between Ukrainians and
Russians. The cartographic analysis reveals that the Austrian-Russian historical border
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is relevant in electoral behavior as well as the Interwar border of the USSR (fig. 1).
However,  there  are  some  limitations  to  the  effect  of  historical  legacies  on  voting
behavior: (1) overlapping effects of contemporary administrative divisions, (2) they are
not relevant for all parties, and (3) they are dependent on the context of elections and
political parties’ electoral strategies.
 
Figure 1. Examples of phantom borders manifestations on electoral maps of Ukraine.
10 Phantom borders of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Interwar USSR are the most
clearly manifested historical borders on electoral maps of Ukraine. However, they are
essential only in cases of voting for communists and socialists, right-wing, and parties
that were perceived by the local population as pro-Russian. The Interwar border is a
territorial  cleavage  most  visible  for  Communist  and  Socialist  parties’  support  in
1994-2014 parliamentary elections. It is interesting that in the case of the Chernivtsi
oblast the former border of Austria-Hungary is also framing support for Communists
and Socialists  in 2002-2014,  while in Ternopil  oblast  it  is  essential  only in the 2012
parliamentary elections. 
11 Moreover, patterns of voting for the Party of Regions in 2006-2012 elections also reveal
how  changes  in  electoral  strategies  of  political  powers  might  influence  the
manifestation  of  phantom  borders  on  electoral  maps.  While  in  2006  and  2007
parliamentary elections territorial cleavage of the Party of Regions support was going
along the Interwar border of USSR (except for Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya oblasts), in
2012 elections it was narrowed to Austro-Hungarian empire border and more precisely
to Galicia province border (fig. 1). Paul Manafort trial documents (‘Documents detailing
Paul Manafort’s work in Ukraine (Part 2 of 3)’) reveal strategic changes in the Party of
Regions organization and local politics with the emphasis on local-national alliance and
stronger representation at the local level based on incorporation of local elites into the
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party, which resulted in 2010 local elections win. Such approaches were not successful
only in historical Galicia, while had strategic value in Central and Western Ukraine and
penetrated the other side of the Interwar border, which was previously a territorial
cleavage for the Party of Regions support. 
12 We should  admit  that  Chernivtsi  and Zakarpattya  oblasts  being  less  supportive  for
Communists  showed  higher  support  for  the  Party  of  Regions  in  2006-2012  in
comparison to other Western Ukraine oblasts. Partially it might be interpreted in terms
of ethnopolitical entrepreneurship and better mobilization of rayons and cities of these
regions  where  Hungarian  and  Romanian  minorities  constitute  the  majority  of  the
population. However, analysis of voting behavior in rayons and cities where national
minorities constitute a substantial part of the population suggests that voting patterns
are following rayons administrative borders instead of the lines of ethnic belonging.
However,  cases  of  Gertsaivskyi  in  Chernivtsi  and  Beregivskyi  rayon  in  Zakarpattya
oblast might be an example of contextual effect and pressure of local social norms.
These rayons are the only two territories in those regions where national minorities
constitute near three-fourths of the total population, and they have the highest and
most stable support for the Party of Regions in 2006-2012. Moreover, regional contexts
in those oblasts are also essential, which is evident from their low level of support for
right-wing  parties  without  any  dependence  on  ethnic  composition  or  historical
divisions, but clearly following administrative border (fig. 2). 
13 On the  other  hand,  in  three  Galician  and two Volhynian oblasts,  the  Interwar  and
Austria-Hungary borders are also manifested in the levels of support for right-wing
political  parties.  Nasha Ukraina (Our  Ukraine)  in  2002-2007,  Kostenko and Pliushch
Block  in  2006,  Svoboda  (Freedom)  in  2012,  Narodnyi  Front  (People’s  Front)  and
Samopomich  party  results  in  2014  are  framed  by  Galicia  province  border  and  the
Interwar border of USSR (fig. 2). Galicia from 1991 is nationalist and right-wing political
parties and candidates stronghold. In case of moderate right, the Interwar border is
more strongly manifested in electoral results (for instance, Our Ukraine result in 2002),
while,  in  the  case  of  far-right,  Galicia  province  border  (without  northern  Ternopil
oblast) is the territorial cleavage of support (voting for Svoboda in 2012).We should
admit  that  the  categorization  of  parties  in  Ukraine  along  the  ideological  lines  is
debatable; therefore, we use their rhetoric during electoral campaigns as a criteria. In
the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Galicia province border was framing the highest
support  for  People’s  Front,  which  chose  more  right-wing  and  pro-NATO  political
rhetoric than Poroshenko’s Block. At the same time, it was also the regional basis for
the Samopomich party in 2014, which is center-right and was also broadly supported in
cities in other parts of Ukraine.
14 Moreover,  the  importance  of  administrative  borders  is  evident  in  the  case  of
Samopomich territorial patterns of support. The party successfully mobilized Lviv and
Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts in 2012 but was not so successful in Ternopil oblast (fig. 2).
Contrarily, in 2006 parliamentary elections Kostenko and Pliushch Block was successful
mobilizing Ternopil oblast as well as Volhynian oblasts, while was less supported in
Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts (fig. 1). Consequently, not only a historical legacy but
the  way  political  parties  are  mobilizing  electorate  within  administrative  borders  is
important. 
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Figure 2. Examples of phantom borders manifestations on electoral maps of Ukraine (case of right-
wing and nationalist parties).
 
Administrative borders 
15 Administrative borders were essential for electoral strategies in the 1990s (Matsuzato,
2001, 2002) and continued to be influential in the 2000s. Matsuzato (2001, 2002) was
critical  about  Western  approaches  to  study  elections  in  Ukraine  based  on  public
opinion polls and compositional effect because he assumes Ukrainian elections to be
semi-competitive and clientelist in their nature. He admitted that in the case when
mayors  and  governors  are  openly  supporting  the  incumbent  president  and  the
president  is  changing  regional  governors  before  elections  pursuing  electoral
effectiveness elections cannot be called free and fair. Matsuzato (2001) states that for
Kuchma win in the 1999 presidential elections alliances with local elites in Donetsk,
Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa regions were crucial. 
16 Such  considerations  are  supported  by  cartographic  analysis  of  1991-2002  elections
when there were no stable territorial structures of political support and mobilization
along  administrative  borders  was  a  vivid  phenomenon.  For  instance,  in  2002
parliamentary  elections  Za  Edynu  Ukrainu  (For  United  Ukraine)  mobilized  Donetsk
oblast,  Social-Democratic  Party (United)  had a  regional  basis  in Zakarpattya,  Ednist
(Unity) party won a majority of votes only in Brusylivskyi rayon of Zhytomyr oblast.
Moreover,  mobilization  of  oblasts  or  rayons  might  have  a  long-lasting  effect.  For
instance,  in  1998  Lazarenko’s  Gromada  Party  won  elections  only  in  “home”
Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In 2002 elections it was not participating, and when it was back
in 2006, the party still had a high level of support in the Dnipropetrovsk region. 
17 In the case of Ukraine, it is essential to assume that administrative divisions are new
institutionalized  symbolical  orders.  Bourdieu  (1991)  suggests  that  frontiers  are
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produced by cultural differences as well as produce new cultural differences. The same
is  true  about  administrative  borders,  which  are  regions  of  new  symbolical  and
institutional shapes and often are appealing to regional consciousness and interests.
Moreover,  administrative  borders  frame  information  flows,  communications  and
resources redistribution. 
18 Moreover, in low-income countries administrative borders use in electoral purposes
might lead to clientelist relations, especially in the case of electoral law manipulations.
For example, in 1994, former Soviet communists’ fear of being not reelected resulted in
the majoritarian electoral system in Ukraine, where political parties nominated only
11% of the candidates. In 1998-2002 and 2012-2014 Ukraine had a mixed voting system,
which was vulnerable to the development of clientelist relations. For instance, Allina-
Pisano (2010) states that it could lead to changes in the social contract in society when
people receive rewards only for political loyalty. Herron and Sjoberg (2016) also assume
that  clientelist  relations  in  majoritarian  voting  in  Ukraine  might  be  understood as
votes buying. For Burilkov (2015) the problem is also with PR vote in case of a Soviet
model of hierarchical relations in the factories of the South-East of the country and
Osipian (Osipian,  2010) suggested that the same model of  relations was used at  the
universities to mobilize students for meetings and protests. 
 
Constituency politics 
19 Electoral  engineering  and  professional  approach  to  campaigning  can  increase  the
effects of constituency campaigning (Denver, Hands, Fisher & MacAllister, 2002), and
canvassing  in  local  electoral  campaigns  might  change  the  nature  of  friends  and
neighbors effect (Gorecki & Marsh, 2012). The electoral geography of Ukraine is mainly
concerned  with  the  geography  of  support  without  proper  attention  to  electoral
strategies and canvassing. The cartographic analysis revealed two unique cases of local
electoral campaigns influence on electoral behavior. As was previously mentioned, in
1998-2002 and 2012-2014 mixed electoral system was used for parliamentary elections
(225 MPs were elected in single-member districts and 225 by PR vote), and parties and
candidates have parallel campaigns at the national level and for local constituencies. 
20 We found two administrative districts, which were divided between two constituencies
and faced intense electoral campaigning at constituency level. One case is the Skvyrskyi
rayon of Kyiv oblast. Part of it was in a constituency where a candidate from the UDAR
party had intense campaigning during the 2012 elections. As a result, his party won
elections at polling stations only in the part of the rayon, which was in his constituency
(fig. 3). The same happened in the Ichnyanskyi rayon of Chernihiv oblast, which was
divided by the border of the constituency. In the part of it where Oleh Lyashko (leader
of  the  Radical  Party)  was  canvassing,  his  party  won  the  majority  in  many  polling
stations, while on the other side of constituency border results were not so impressive. 
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Figure 3. Examples of constituencies and administrative borders manifestations on electoral maps
of Ukraine (only polling stations where each party won elections).
21 We should admit that it is not apparent that a successful constituency campaign results
in higher shares of party support at PR vote. However, in the 2012 elections UDAR party
was efficiently using this strategy. Party mobilized six constituencies to vote not only
for their candidates at a single-member constituency but also have higher levels of
support for the party at the national level. It is a strategy new parties are often using to
gain support and win some places in the parliament. For instance, in 1998 elections
Yuliya  Tymoshenko  was  elected  from  a  single-member  constituency  in  Kirovograd
oblast. As a result, in 2002-2014 her party get higher levels of support in that area in
comparison to neighboring territories (fig. 3). However, cartographic analysis at polling
stations level also reveals that the pattern of support was not following the border of
the constituency but only two administrative rayons had stable and higher levels of
support for Tymoshenko’s party. The same is true about two constituencies were the
UDAR party received the highest support in 2012 – voters were mobilized not in the
whole constituency, but only in one rayon following administrative border (fig. 3). The
cartographic analysis also reveals that higher levels of party support at the national
level  proportional  representation  vote  are  not  obviously  translated  into  winning
positions  in  single-member  districts.  For  instance,  the  Communist  party  had  high
support in northern Zhytomyr and Chernihiv oblasts but did not win SMD votes there. 
 
Scaling “our man” voting 
22 Friends  and  neighbors  effect  is  a  well-studied  voting  phenomenon  in  Western
countries, while in Ukrainian electoral geography it is out of attention. We suggest that
in Ukraine a better approach is to study not just friends and neighbors effect but “our
man” effect and how parties and candidates are trying to scale it. Consequently, it is
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not just about local advantage (Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1983) or patterns of the geographical
distribution  of  information  about  candidates  (Bowler,  Donovan  &  Snipp,  1993)  but
opportunities to use the symbolical capital of being known and even being associated
with the places of different scales. It is also about the use of administrative resources
and local channels of communication to scale “our man” effect. Because of poverty,
lack of resources, weak democratic institutions and low civic engagement in politics it
might lead to expressed by Allina-Pisano (2010) effect of  corrupting changes in the
social contract in society and patron-client relationships. 
23 We propose to examine some cases. First, Volodymyr Lytvyn, being a popular politician
at  the  national  level,  in  2007  parliamentary  elections  successfully  scaled  ‘our  man’
effect only to the local level and had low efficiency of using it at oblast level. In 2007,
his party, Lytvyn’s Block, won representation in the parliament. However, in rayon,
where he was born only at polling stations closest to his birthplace and in rayon center
his party won a majority of votes (fig. 4). Contrarily, Viktor Yushchenko’s party Our
Ukraine won 2002 elections in the rayon he was born and in neighboring rayons and
received a high level of support in the whole Sumy oblast (despite northern rayons
which were voting for Communists). In 2006-2007 elections, despite the popularity of
the party was decreasing, it still had strong support in those areas (fig. 4). Even in 2012,
when Our Ukraine did not reach the PR vote threshold, it has strong support in closest
to Yushchenko’s home village polling stations. However, these two cases are friends
and neighbors effects with different levels of success to scale such voting patterns to
the regional level. 
24 The third case is a combination of local politics, administrative resources and ’our man’
vote in the electoral success of the Communist party in Lubeshivskyi rayon of Volyn
oblast.  In  2006-2007,  the  Communist  party  started  to  develop  its  local  basis  in
Lubeshivskyi  rayon  of  Volyn  oblast  in  Western  Ukraine.  In  2010  they  won  local
elections. In one of the villages in that rayon Adam Martyniuk, one of the leaders of the
Communist  Party,  was  born.  In  such  a  case,  control  over  local  authorities,  local
information channels, and high-ranking politician as a countryman created a situation
when  some  local  infrastructure  improvements  were  presented  as  Communists
achievements and help from the countryman. It also resulted in high support for the
Communists at national elections in the rayon of the region where right-wing parties
have the second strongest support after Galicia. However, when the Communist party
lost its popularity after the 2014 Revolution, in parliamentary elections 2014, it won a
majority of votes only in the village where Adam Martyniuk was born. 
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Figure 4. Politicians birthplaces and different scaling effects of ‘our man’ voting (only polling
stations where each party won elections).
25 ‘Our man’ voting is also revealed in the case when the career path of the politician is
associated  with  a  particular  administrative  unit.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of
Poroshenko’s  electoral  success  and  territorial  patterns  of  electoral  support  for  his
party  in  the  2014  parliamentary  elections,  Vinnytsya  oblast  is  standing  out  of  the
national pattern of support (fig. 4). His career path was positively associated with this
oblast. However, it is not just about such kind of perceptions, but also control over
regional authorities and regional media, which create additional opportunities to scale
’our man’ voting to the regional level. 
26 However, the administrative oblast level was not a geographical limit for ‘our man’
voting in Ukraine. After the Orange revolution, as Manafort case documents reveal, the
Party of Regions strategic step was to unite all local and regional administrative and
business groups in South-Eastern Ukraine who were in fear of changes. Consequently in
2006 parliamentary elections Party of Regions was promoting itself as ’our men’ party
for South-Eastern part of Ukraine. Our analysis of Party of Regions 72 MPs who got
seats in the parliament by the party list in 2012 parliamentary elections, shows that 24
of them were born in Donetsk oblast, 20 more in Russia, and in six out of nine oblasts of
south-eastern Ukraine no one was born (fig. 5). However, localness of party leaders and
MPs despite their disproportionate number from Donetsk oblast was successfully scaled
to the macroregional level of South-Eastern Ukraine in 2006-2012.
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Figure 5. Number of the Party of Regions MPs birthplaces by oblasts (only those who were elected
by party list (PR vote) in 2012 parliamentary elections).
 
Discussion and conclusion
27 The cartographic analysis revealed that historical borders are manifested on electoral
maps of Ukraine only in the case of voting for communists, socialists, right-wing, and
parties that are perceived as pro-Russian. However, we should be cautious about the
effects of historical legacies on electoral behavior and pay attention to the effects of
contemporary administrative borders and electoral strategies of political parties. While
the Interwar border was territorial cleavage in case of voting for the Communist party,
local  politics,  administrative  resources,  and  ’our  man’  effect  resulted  in  leading
positions of the party in Lubeshivskyi rayon of Volyn oblast in 2006-2012 parliamentary
elections. We also revealed that only Interwar border of the USSR and border between
Austria-Hungary  and  the  Russian  empire  have  electoral  behavior  patterns  that  are
strictly  following  phantom  borders.  In  the  case  of  central,  southern,  and  eastern
Ukraine contemporary administrative divisions have stronger electoral manifestations.
28 Control over administrative authorities at the oblast level was essential for the rise of
oligarchs and corrupted privatization in the 1990s. It was manifested in the territorial
shapes  of  parties  support  in  1998  and  2002  elections.  In  2006-2007  parliamentary
elections Party of Regions scaled ‘our man’ effect to South-Eastern Ukraine and country
was  territorially  polarized.  In  2012  realigning  elections,  Party  of  Regions  changed
strategy  to  the  local-national  alliance  and  strengthened  local  party  organizations.
Incorporation of local elites into the party organization was successful in Central and
Western Ukraine and failed only within Galician province historical border (without
northern part of  Ternopil  oblasts).  In such a context,  administrative borders at  the
oblast level  became less important than historical  and local  administrative borders.
Consequently,  a  manifestation of  historical  borders on electoral  maps of  Ukraine is
limited  and  parties  electoral  strategies  might  evoke  them.  Moreover,  the  question
about the conscious use of historical divisions by political parties (Jańczak, 2015) or
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durable effects of historically constituted political cultures and orientations in the case
of phantom borders manifestations is open. 
29 We assume that territorial configurations and shapes of electoral behavior in Ukraine
should be understood as a result of overlapping effects of different types of borders at
different levels as well as other factors of electoral behavior and electoral strategies of
political parties.  Our analysis reveals that single-member constituencies borders are
manifested in PR voting for parties in the cases of successful use of local canvassing and
intensity of campaigning. We also propose to pay more attention to ‘our man’ effect in
the electoral geography of Ukraine, especially its scaling, which is accompanied by the
use  of  all  available  resources  and  administrative  borders  as  institutional  and
organizational frameworks. The reasons for the success or failure of ’our man’ voting in
Ukraine need further examination.
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The  electoral  geography  of  Ukraine is  predominantly  based  on  compositional  effect  studies,
which consider nationality, language, and foreign policy orientations as main cleavage lines in
Ukrainian society. Alternatively, scholars admit statistical significance of the regional factor and
often interpret it as a historically constituted political culture. Both approaches are based on
census and state statistics data (most often at oblast  (regional)  level)  and construct artificial
regions for research purposes. We assume that such approaches neglect underlying territorial
configurations of electoral behavior in Ukraine. The paper is based on data at polling stations
level for 2002-2014 parliamentary elections. The thorough cartographic analysis was conducted
to clarify in what cases phantom borders are manifested in electoral maps and to reveal other
territorial  configurations  of  electoral  behavior  in  Ukraine.  We  found  that  historical  borders
influence is limited to voting for nationalists, communists, and parties which are perceived as
pro-Russian, their manifestations are dependent on each elections context and parties’ electoral
strategies, and they are complicated by the overlapping effects of the other factors of electoral
behavior (including administrative borders). The paper reveals that constituency campaigning in
single-member districts (SMD) can influence parties’ results at the national level PR vote and that
scaling of “our man” voting is essential for parties’  electoral success and is used in electoral
strategies. We also accentuate the role of administrative borders, local-national and regional-
national alliances in electoral geography of Ukraine. 
La  géographie  électorale  de  l’Ukraine  est  majoritairement  basée  sur  des  études  d’effets  de
composition, qui considèrent la nationalité, la langue et les orientations de politique extérieure
comme les principales marques de clivage dans la société ukrainienne.
D’autre part, les scientifiques reconnaissent l’importance statistique du facteur régional qu’ils
interprètent souvent comme une culture politique constituée historiquement.
Les deux approches se basent sur les recensements et les données statistiques de l’Etat (le plus
souvent  au  niveau  régional  (“oblast”),  et  élaborent  des  régions  artificielles  à  des  fins  de
recherche.
Nous sommes d’avis que ces deux approches laissent de côté les configurations territoriales qui
sous-tendent les comportements électoraux en Ukraine.  Cet  article  est  basé sur  des  données
recueillies au niveau des bureaux de vote lors des élections parlementaires de 2002-2004. Une
analyse cartographique approfondie a été réalisée pour clarifier dans quels cas les frontières
fantômes  se  manifestent  dans  les  cartes  électorales  et  pour  faire  apparaître  d’autres
configurations  territoriales  relatives  au  comportement  des  électeurs  ukrainiens.  Nous  avons
découvert que l’influence des frontières historiques se limite à voter pour les nationalistes, les
communistes et les partis perçus comme pro-russes. Leurs manifestations dépendent de chaque
contexte électoral et des stratégies électorales des partis, et ceci se complique à cause des effets
de chevauchement induits par les autres facteurs de comportement électoral (en ce compris les
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frontières administratives).
L’article montre que mener une campagne électorale dans des districts à candidat unique peut
influencer les résultats des partis au niveau national, et que l’effet d’échelle du vote pour “notre
représentant”  est  essentiel  pour  le  succès  des  partis,  et  utilisé  dans  leurs  stratégies.  Nous
mettons aussi l’accent sur le rôle des frontières administratives, des alliances local-national et
régional-national dans cette géographie.
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